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The
New York Times
The Legacy of Legacies
By
Jerome Karabel
They
are personal questions, of course, often asked more
out of courtesy than curiosity, but their
answers reveal a story about not only
It
is an admirable goal. Yet the persistence of legacy preferences may not be
fully appreciated by either Mr. Bush or his opponent, John Kerry, who has also
called for their abolition - and whose father also went to Yale. If
In
the fall of 1963, George W. Bush was a senior at
But
unbeknownst to the dean and Mr. Bush, Yale had quietly changed its admissions
policy toward alumni sons during the very months when his application was under
consideration. As the number of applicants to Yale increased, the
administration decided that it could no longer afford to treat all legacy
applicants equally. Instead, it would differentiate among alumni sons, giving
extra preference on the basis of the family's contribution to Yale and its
importance to American society.
As
the son of a prominent
Less
than two years later, in an abrupt change in policy, Yale's new dean of
admissions, R. Inslee Clark, presided over a radical reduction in legacy
preference. By 1967, Mr. Clark's second year in office, the proportion of
alumni sons in the freshman class plummeted to 12 percent from 17 percent in
the class of 1968, George W. Bush's class.
The
reaction of the alumni was swift and furious. By the
end of 1966, the alumni were in open revolt,
and Yale's
alumni board hastily formed a special
committee to
investigate the matter. In 1967,
William F. Buckley, an
alumnus then running an insurgent campaign
for a seat on
the Yale Corporation, declared that Yale had
ceased to be
the "kind of place where your family goes
for generations"
and had been transformed into an institution
where "the son
of an alumnus, who goes to a private
preparatory school,
now has less chance of getting in than some
boy from P.S.
109 somewhere."
In
truth, Yale had not eliminated the legacy preference
even under Mr. Clark. But the new dean
had brought the admissions rate of legacy applicants closer to that of
non-legacy applicants than at any point in Yale's history. By 1970, Mr. Clark
was gone, and by 1974 - just as a major fund-raising effort was beginning - the
legacy preference was even stronger than when George W. Bush and John F. Kerry
had applied more than a decade earlier.
Yale's
chief competitors, Harvard and
note of the turmoil created by this
radical experiment, and neither ever tried an admissions policy remotely as meritocratic as Yale's under Dean Clark. (Recently, both
Harvard and
The
consequences of the Yale episode are with us still, for the elite colleges drew
from it the lesson that the costs of seriously encroaching on alumni privileges
are simply too high. Because of the elite universities' investment in the
current system, change is unlikely to come from within. But President Bush's denunciation of legacy
preference may well have set in motion a public debate that will bring about
the demise of this anachronistic policy.
A
useful first step would be consideration of a bill introduced last fall by
Senator Edward Kennedy that would require universities "to publish data on
the racial and socioeconomic composition of legatees." So, too, would a
requirement that universities disclose the admission rate of legacies and
non-legacies as a way of casting a spotlight on a policy that is, in the end,
indefensible.
Such
legislation may not end legacy preferences. But it would subject them to the
public scrutiny befitting a democratic society - a scrutiny that could well be
fatal.
Jerome
Karabel, a professor of sociology at the University of
California at Berkeley, is the author of the forthcoming book "The Chosen:
Admission and Exclusion at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, 1900 to Today."